Dr. Sung is a world famous designer of androids. His wife, Sarah, is dying of an incurable disease. In a desperate attempt to save the only woman he ever loved, Dr. Sung designs an android that, to all casual observers, is physically indistinguishable from Sarah. Furthermore, Dr. Sung records the thoughts, memories and beliefs of Sarah and devises a program that reproduces them in the android. After Sarah dies, Dr. Sung activates the android. The android seems to recall her marriage to Dr. Sung, to be deeply in love with him and to have all the same thoughts and memories as Sarah.
Has Sarah survived her death? In other words, is Sarah identical to the android?
The android that Dr. Sung created is not identical to Sarah. Using John Locke's memory view with the definition that: person ‘a’ is identical to person ‘b’ if and only if person ‘b’ has a direct or indirect link of real memories that person ‘a’ also has, it is clear the Sarah and the android are not the same person. The android has a record of Sarah's thoughts, memories, and beliefs, and acts the same way as Sarah, however these memories that the android 'has' weren't real memories that the android experienced. The memories were data that Dr. Sung had recorded and then implanted into the android. Since these memories that the android has aren't even actually from the android’s experiences, it cannot be said that the android has real memories that are of a direct or indirect link to the memories that Sarah had. Having real memories along with having an indirect or direct link of memory is necessary when deciding if someone is identical to someone else. Therefore, the android is not identical to Sarah. If the android and Sarah were to be identical, the android would have to also have actually experienced what Sarah had experienced to formulate the same exact memories, which would serve as the real memories necessary to link two bodies together into being identical. By having the android actually experience the memories themselves, this would solve the problem of having fake memories, and since the memories were the exact same to what Sarah had, this also solves the problem of having a direct or indirect link of memory. However, since the android clearly didn’t experience what Sarah had in the past, and therefore hadn’t created the real memories Sarah had, the android created by Dr. Sung to represent his wife isn’t identical to Sarah.
ReplyDeleteThe android replication of Sarah is not identical to Sarah because the android cannot form its own thoughts in the way Sarah could. Dr. Sung, an android maker, recreates his wife, who is dying of an incurable disease in the form of an android. This android is indistinguishable from Sarah and has been programmed to recall specific thoughts, memories, and beliefs. When Sarah dies, and the android is activated, the android appears to have all the same thoughts and feelings as Sarah. The question is raised if the android is the same person as Sarah and if she survived her death. I disagree and think that Sarah did not survive her death. The android is programmed to act as Sarah would and to feel the things Sarah has already felt. I think that because of this, the android is not Sarah. It is not acting as Sarah would. It is acting as it thinks Sarah would. The “memories” the android has are not real and have been formed in an artificial way. The android has not experienced the memories it has been programmed to have, and it does not create thoughts as Sarah would. It creates thoughts and feeling as it assumes Sarah would. The android is not identical to Sarah, although they may look the same, the psychological makeup of the android is not identical to Sarah, You cannot predict someone to do something and always be right, so the android can never be truly identical to Sarah, and Sarah has not survived her death.
ReplyDeleteThe android that Dr. Sung created would be Sarah. This may seem weird that an android can be the same person as a dead person, but the creation of something isn’t what would define it. It wouldn’t matter that Dr. Sung created Sarah instead of the typical way humans are made. In this situation, the android would be physically indistinguishable from Sarah and have the same beliefs, desires, and thoughts. This would mean that she would be indistinguishable from Sarah to the outside world and even to herself she would be indistinguishable from Sarah. If no one can tell the difference, she would be the same in every way that would count. For example, if Fred was about to eat an apple and then Bob came by and took his apple. Bob then proceeded to take out another apple that is indistinguishable from Fred’s apple and then mixed them up so that Fred didn’t know which one was originally his. If Bob then hands one apple back to Fred, Fred would never know if he had his original apple or if he was eating Bob’s apple, but in either case, the apple would be the same to him, since he couldn’t tell. This situation would be the same as the Eternal Beloved situation, with one difference. Dr. Sung would know which one was which. Although Dr. Sung would be aware of the difference, it wouldn’t matter. This is because he has no way of knowing for sure that the android is still the android and not Sarah. This may sound confusing because he made the android, so he must know. However, while Dr. Sung wasn’t looking the android could have been replaced with a revived version of Sarah. Even though this is basically impossible to carry out, since there is the possibility of it happening, Dr. Sung, much like everyone else, can not distinguish between the two.
ReplyDeleteNo, Sarah is not identical to the android, and therefore did not survive her death. In order to claim personal identity, one must be able to point to either bodily continuity or memory continuity. Sarah does not maintain the prior, as her body certainly does not remain in tact through her death and the consequent construction of the android. To the latter, while her memories and beliefs are preserved, I would argue that maintaining memory continuity also requires neurophysiological continuity. When Sarah dies, her physical brain is not transferred to the android, a new one is fabricated based off the thoughts and beliefs of her previous one, therefore proving that she does not maintain continuity of memory. In addition, similarly to Ava, the main character in the film Ex Machina, the new Sarah does not think for herself, but instead uses her knowledge of all of Sarah's prior interactions to form her behavior. However, when a situation the old Sarah had not encountered arises, she will be unable to think logically and respond in a reasonable manner, again proving that they are not identical, as Sarah would be able to.
ReplyDeleteThe android is just a shadow of Sarah because the original Sarah is dead. The android Dr. Sung made is just sort of a zombie because it doesn’t have conscious experience. Although the android might be performing the same exact function, the android doesn’t actually think – it just processes information and performs an action based on a set of instructions (those instructions being a program designed to make the android act exactly like Sarah). There could also be multiple exactly similar androids, which creates problems because surely not all of them could be Sarah. The idea behind the personal identity is that each person has their own identity, but the android isn’t only not Sarah, it isn’t even a person. It can’t really have original thoughts – again, it just processes information and produces an output so that it can look like a human. The android also cannot always accurately predict what Sarah would have done in certain situations, because its decisions cannot be as complex as human decisions can be. Dr. Sung could simply ignore all of this and keep going with his life pretending that the android is Sarah – and he will probably be fine doing that if he doesn’t remember the fact that he made the android and that it’s not actually Sarah.
ReplyDeleteSarah did not survive her death because the android is not the same as Sarah. Prior to Sarah’s death, her husband wrote down all of her beliefs, memories, and thoughts, so he would be able to recreate her as an android. This new android is merely an imitation of who Sarah was when she was alive. First, Sarah and the android are different people according to the body view because Sarah and the android have completely different bodies. Yes, the android is created in such a way that it seems identical to Sarah, but we know that there is no bodily continuity with Sarah and the android. To an ordinary person, it would seem as if Sarah and the android have bodily continuity, but we know for a fact that the android is not the same as Sarah’s body even though they are “physically indistinguishable”. Secondly, Sarah and the android are not the same according to the memory view. In this scenario, it is said that the android has the same thoughts and memories as Sarah because her husband recorded them and reproduced them using a program. However, this does not make the memories and thoughts the exact same because they are simply interpretations of Sarah’s thought and memories from the perspective of her husband. There is no possible way that they could have been exactly transplanted into the android. Even if the impossible happened and the android had the same exact memories and thoughts, there is a break in the continuity of memories when they were transplanted into the android. Therefore, Sarah could not have survived her death because the android does not have bodily or memory continuity.
ReplyDeletehttps://docs.google.com/document/d/1ri5-E6uB_nzifutBmdq0EYf1sbR5ft-JbH3FTEnCzfM/edit?usp=sharing
ReplyDeleteWhen the android is created, Sarah’s memories must be cloned. Thought these memories weren’t experienced by the android, they are ‘real’ in the sense that someone did indeed experience them. From a functionalist perspective, I would say that Sarah has survived her death, but she isn’t identical to the android. Death is a phenomenon that is exclusively observed by the outside world. If death is defined by a ceasing of conscious experience, their lack of consciousness makes it impossible for them to answer, “Am I dead?” One can surmise their own existence - as it is self-evident - and infer the existence of others based on their continuity in human nature.
ReplyDeleteI am human. I conscious.
You are human. You must be conscious too.
Thus, a functional account of death is the only robust account of death. Android Sarah and real Sarah share a continuity of consciousness. In one account, she isn’t dead because her consciousness continues; she acts the same speaks the same, etc. In another account, she is dead because the android isn’t identical to her. A distinction is then made between the questions of survival versus questions of sameness. The android and Sarah aren’t the same from a physical platonic forms perspective. The platonic form of an android isn’t the same as the form of the platonic Sarah. Functionally speaking, this android is the same. Inherently speaking it is not. Because questions of death pertain more to the mind, a continuity in consciousness backed in functional equivalency would mean Sarah isn’t dead. Because questions of sameness pertain more to platonic forms, Sarah and the droid aren’t the same.